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Summary: It is usually supposed that biological design arguments (where biologi-
cal complex order is seen as evidence of a Creator) are made obsolete by Darwi-
nian evolutionary theory. However, philosopher Alvin Plantinga and others have
defended the continued possibility of a rational “design discourse”, in which
biological order is taken as a sign of God’s purposeful action. In this article, I
consider two objections to design discourse: (1) a theological objection to biologi-
cal design based on the problem of natural evil, and (2) the evolutionary objec-
tion, according to which evolutionary theory removes the justification for any
biological design perception. Whereas Plantinga’s own response utilizes the
arguments of the Intelligent Design movement, I argue in favor of utilizing “de-
sign discourse” as part of a theistic evolutionist view.
Keywords: theistic evolutionism, teleology, design argument, problem of natural
evil, Alvin Plantinga
Zusammenfassung: Es wird gemeinhin angenommen, dass biologische Design
Argumente (welche die komplexe biologische Ordnung als Beweis für einen
Schöpfer erachten) durch Darwins Evolutionstheorie obsolet werden. Der Philo-
soph Alvin Plantinga und andere haben jedoch die Möglichkeit eines fortgeführ-
ten rationalen „Design Diskurses“ verteidigt, der die biologische Ordnung als ein
Zeichen Gottes zielgerichteter Handlung begreift. In diesem Artikel betrachte ich
zwei Einwände gegen den Design Diskurs: (1) einen theologischen Einwand zum
biologischen Design basierend auf dem Problem der natürlichen Übel und (2) den
evolutionären Einwand, nach dem die Evolutionstheorie die Berechtigung jeder
biologischen Design Vorstellung aufhebt. Während Plantingas eigene Antwort
die Argumente der intelligenten Design Bewegung anwendet, argumentiere ich
für die Anwendung des „Design Diskurses“ als Element einer theistischen evolu-
tionären Sicht.
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I Plantinga’s Understanding of “Design
Discourse”
It is usually supposed that biological design arguments (where biological com-
plex order is seen as evidence of a Creator) are made obsolete by Darwinian
evolutionary theory. This appears to have been Darwin’s view as well. In a famous
passage in his autobiography, Darwin wrote that “the old argument of design in
nature, as given by Paley, which formerly seemed to me so conclusive, falls, now
that the law of natural selection has been discovered. We can no longer argue
that, for instance, the beautiful hinge of a bivalve shell must have been made by
an intelligent being, like the hinge of a door by a man.”1 Evolution is not usually
taken to imply that theism and evolutionary theory are logically incompatible.
Rather, it simply taken to mean that we can no longer rationally arrive at theism,
or derive evidential support for theism, by considering the complex, apparently
purposeful order of biological organisms. The same understanding is repeated by
both theistic and atheistic interpreters of evolution.2
In his book “Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion and Natural-
ism”, philosopher Alvin Plantinga defends the idea that the purposeful designed-
ness of biological organisms might give grounds for belief in God even in our
contemporary situation. However, instead of a design argument, Plantinga de-
fends what he calls a “design discourse”.3 Plantinga argues that we do not need
to be able to demonstrate that biology has a designer through arguments in order
to hold that their order does reveal the wisdom of the Creator. Rather, Plantinga
argues that belief in a Creator simply arises in us as something like a perceptual
belief. To defend the reliability of this belief, it is sufficient to simply refute
1 Charles DARWIN, The Autobiography of Charles Darwin. Ed. Nora Barlow. London: Collins,
1958.
2 See e. g. Michael RUSE, 2003. Darwin and Design: Does Evolution Have a Purpose? Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press. Contemporary natural theologians like Richard SWINBURNE (The
Existence of God, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) thus do not give biology a central place
in their defences of the rationality of theistic belief. To the extent that their arguments rely on the
natural science, the sciences in question are cosmology and physics.
3 Alvin PLANTINGA, Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion and Naturalism. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011. Chapter 8.
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objections to this belief, not to produce an argument. Plantinga’s goal is to
demonstrate that Christians are rational in believing that they perceive divine
purpose in biology. This is an interesting argument that promises to redeem
Paley’s argument of the biological world as a temple which reflects the glory of
God for all to see, but can all objections be answered?
Plantinga’s argument follows in the footsteps of 19th-century philosopher
Thomas Reid (1710–96), who argued that belief in design is based on a non-
inferential capacity to detect design that all humans have and that is required to
detect even the intelligence of other humans. Just as we perceive that other
humans have minds, and that human artifacts are purposefully created, so too we
also perceive that there is a Creator of nature. According to Reid, design argu-
ments can act to reinforce the reliability of this initial perception, but such
arguments are not necessary for belief.4 In the recent discussion, Reid’s general
line of the argument has been followed not only by Plantinga, but also by Del
Ratzsch, Mats Wahlberg and John T. Mullen.5 All have claimed in different ways
that belief in the designedness of biology may be rationally based simply on the
human perception of biology as designed. This belief can be rationally analysed
and perhaps even developed into a formal argument, but such arguments are,
according to Plantinga, usually not the original source of the belief. This basic
contention is plausible: as Plantinga notes, both defenders and critics of design
arguments have noted that they can feel the intuitive force of design as an
explanation.6
In my view, Plantinga’s design discourse is interesting, since (if successful) it
appears to satisfy two desiderata that are important for any Christian natural
theology.7 First, it is desirable to “save the phenomena” of ordinary religious
4 Thomas REID, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785), essay V. Ed. Derek R. Brookes.
University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 2002
5 Del RATZSCH, Nature, Design and Science: The Status of Design in Natural Science. Albany, NY:
State University of New York Press, 2001; Mats Wahlberg, Reshaping Natural Theology: Seeing
Nature as Creation. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); John Tholfsen Mullen, Design Arguments
within a Reidian Epistemology. Unpublished dissertation. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame, 2004.
6 PLANTINGA, Where the Conflict Really Lies, pp. 244–248. For further documentation, see also
C. Stephen EVANS, Natural Signs and Knowledge of God: A New Look at Theistic Arguments.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, chapter 4.
7 For a review of different contemporary natural theologies, see Rope KOJONEN, “Natural
Theology in Evolution: A Review of Critiques and Changes.” The European Journal for Philosophy
of Religion. Vol. 9. No. 2, pp. 83–117. 2017. For discussion of the Barthian theological objection to
natural theology, see Burkhard NONNENMACHER, “Natürliche Theologie und Offenbarung.”
Neue Zeitschrift für Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, Vol. 9. No. 3. 2017, pp. 311–330; and
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belief, and the idea that one could be rational in believing in God even if one is
not able to personally present a fully developed natural theology. This is impor-
tant from the point of view of a responsible theological epistemology, since we
want to defend the possibility that knowledge of God is not only available to the
learned and the wise.8 Plantinga’s “design discourse” aims to show how the
ordinary person’s intuitive, perceptual belief in the designedness of nature could
provide reasonable (if only partial) grounds for religious faith. While other design
arguments (such as the fine-tuning design argument) may be defensible even if
this basic design experience is rejected, these are based on advanced physics and
are more difficult to follow for many laypersons.
Second, it is desirable to avoid the danger of isolating the Christian faith in its
own cultural ghetto, with no common ground or point of contact with the
surrounding reality, and no way to criticize or support the rationality of belief by
appeal to evidence. This would leave aside the biblical (if often contested)
doctrine that God is the Creator of the entire cosmos, and that it has the God-given
capacity to reflect his glory. While we may not want to say that we can “prove”
the existence of God, it still seems desirable to say that the Christian faith can
make sense of reality in a way that provides some intellectual support for it.9
Plantinga’s design discourse satisfies this desideratum by aiming to show how a
common human experience supports belief in God as Creator. Plantinga does not
rule out the possibility that there could be other evidence in favor of belief as well,
but his design discourse appears to be at least a step in this direction.
Plantinga’s defense of a design discourse as providing some internal justifica-
tion for faith is an important development in his own thought. The basis of design
discourse for Plantinga is the perception of design, which can have even “over-
whelming” internal force.10 Plantinga is known for his defense of an externalist
epistemology, in which the warrant enjoyed by a belief is based on the proper
Andrew MOORE, “Theological Critiques of Natural Theology.” In J. H. Brooke, F. Watts &
R. R. Manning (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Natural Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013, pp. 227–244. For two different contemporary defenses of natural theology against Barthian
and other objections, see Alister MCGRATH, Re-Imagining Nature: The Promise of a Christian
Natural Theology. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2016, and Richard SWINBURNE, Faith and
Reason. 2nd Edition.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
8 Plantinga is one of the most well-known critics of such positions. See PLANTINGA,Warranted
Christian Belief.NewYork: Oxford University Press, 2000.
9 For a good discussion of the relation between evidence and faith, see Olli-Pekka VAINIO,
Beyond Fideism: Negotiable Religious Identities. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010. On the theme of
the accessibility, yet resistibility of divine natural revelation, see EVANS, Natural Signs and
Knowledge of God.
10 PLANTINGA,Where the Conflict Really Lies, p. 246.
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functioning of our cognitive faculties. Plantinga argues that we do not need to be
able to verify that our faculties are properly functioning in order for our beliefs to
be warranted. In his Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga aims to show how
Christian belief is warranted if God exists, as a basic belief not requiring the
support of natural theological arguments.11 In contrast to externalists like Plantin-
ga, internalists like Richard Swinburne argue that the rational justification of
beliefs concerns factors that are internally accessible to the person forming that
belief.12 Plantinga has resisted this critique, but his remarks about “design dis-
course” imply that he at least acknowledges the value of feeling the force of some
reason for belief, even if one cannot put it into words as an argument. This is part
of a general trend where Plantinga has gradually become more friendly towards
the prospects of natural theology.13
In this article, I analyse two objections to Plantinga’s approach. The first
objection is based on the problem of natural evil, and concerns the theological
value of the biological design discourse. For example, evolutionary biologist
Francisco J. Ayala argues that viewing organisms as designed by the Creator
actually comes close to blasphemy, since this would make the Creator also
responsible for the poorly designed features of biological organisms which lead to
suffering. According to Ayala, “Darwin’s gift to religion” is to show how the order
of biology can be explained without the Creator´s intervention.14 Ayala means to
apply this argument particularly against the Intelligent Design movement’s argu-
ments (which are different from Plantinga), and does not address it against
Plantinga directly. However, it seems the question is also pertinent here, since
Plantinga also aims to ascribe responsibility for biological design to God. The
problem of bad design is undoubtedly a major reason why many Christian
11 PLANTINGA,Warranted Christian Belief.
12 See e. g. SWINBURNE, Faith and Reason, pp. 57–63. For example, it is argued that an episte-
mology like Plantinga’s could also be used to defend any kind of religious beliefs, even highly
dubious ones, thus compromising religion as a quest for truth. Plantinga coined the term “the
Great Pumpkin objection” to refer to this class of objections in his paper “The Reformed Objection
to Natural Theology”, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Catholic Philosophical Associa-
tion, Vol. 54, No. 49, pp. 49–62. The objection has since been advanced by Michael Martin and
others. See MARTIN, Atheism: A Philosophical Justification, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University
Press, 1990, pp. 272–276. I am indebted to Ilmari HIRVONEN, “Grandson of the Great Pumpkin:
The Problem of Arbitrariness in Alvin Plantinga’s Apologetic Programme”, a paper presented at
the Helsinki Analytic TheologyWorkshop, 2018.
13 For documentation of this development, see Keith MASCORD, Alvin Plantinga and Christian
Apologetics. Eugene, OR:Wipf & Stock, 2007, chapter 6.
14 Francisco AYALA, Darwin’s Gift to Science and Religion.Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press,
2007.
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believers are also reluctant to use design language about biology in the way
Plantinga does.15
The second objection is based on understanding evolution as a scientific
explanation for the biological designs we observe. The critic may admit here that
we do indeed have prima facie grounds for assuming that biology is designed. In
fact, this is usually admitted by atheistic interpreters of evolutionary theory, such
as Richard Dawkins, who writes that “biology is the study of complicated things
that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose.”16 But – they go on
to argue – now we have another explanation for such features of biology, namely
evolution by natural selection and random mutations. Evolution is a “blind
watchmaker” that can produce design without a designer, and thus it undercuts
the rationality of our intuitive design discourse.
I have selected to analyse these objections because I believe they are linked.
However, there are also many other objections which I do not deal with here. Even
my treatment of the objections based on bad design and evolutionary theory deal
with only some of such objections, as I will point out in each section.17
15 Another reason could be simply that they prefer traditional terms like teleology. For example,
Michael Hanby has recently argued in different ways that Paley and Darwin have bequeathed us a
wholly inadequate concept of teleology, and that we need to return to a more robust account of it.
For someone cognizant of these trends, the word “design”might be understood to ally too closely
with Paley, rather than someone like Thomas Aquinas. However, it seems to me that Plantinga
uses the term design in a very general sense not incompatible with Thomish; he simply means
purposeful creation and ordering. See Michael HANBY, No God, No Science? Theology, Cosmology
and Biology. Malden, MA:Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. See also Simon OLIVER, Creation: A Guide for the
Perplexed. London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2017, chapter 4.
16 Richard DAWKINS, The Blind Watchmaker: How Biology Reveals a Universe Without Design.
New York, NY: Penguin, 1991, 1.
17 Many further theological critiques of using the terminology of design could also be made. For
instance, it might be argued that using the word “design” makes for a too anthropomorphic
conception of the Creator. It brings to mind God as a great engineer, rather than God as the ground
of being, who is able to support us in existence. However, it seems to me there is no special
difficulty in using the word “designer” of God, in comparison with other words like “wise” or
“loving”, which must also be used in an analogous manner. The doctrine of creation does also
traditionally refer to God as the one who has ordered the cosmos – indeed, some exegetes even
argue that this is the only meaning of “creation” explicitly found in the Bible. Here talk of design
as purposeful ordering can find a biblical basis. However, I agree with those theologians who
defend the doctrine of creation out of nothing as also biblical and important. For recent explora-
tions of the doctrine, see particularly David B. BURRELL (ed.) Creation and the God of Abraham.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010; and Matthew LEVERING, Engaging the Doctrine of
Creation: Cosmos, Creatures and the Wise and Good Creator. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic,
2017.
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II Natural Evil as an Objection to Design
The problem of natural evil is closely related to the problem of natural evil, which
is one of the core objections against any belief in God. The traditional objection
against design arguments was eloquently stated by Hume in his Dialogues Con-
cerning Natural Religion:
Look round this universe. What an immense profusion of beings, animated and organized,
sensible and active! You admire this prodigious variety and fecundity. But inspect a little
more narrowly these living existences, the only beings worth regarding. How hostile and
destructive to each other! How insufficient all of them for their own happiness! How
contemptible or odious to the spectator! The whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind
nature, impregnated by a great vivifying principle, and pouring forth from her lap, without
discernment or parental care, her maimed and abortive children.18
Hume goes on to argue that while the existence of natural evil might be logically
compatible with the existence of God (a point now generally conceded after
Plantinga’s work on the topic)19, it at least provides a great amount of counter-
evidence to the idea that God is good and wise.
However, here I will focus on the problem of natural evil as an argument
against theological talk of biological design. This objection has been used often
particularly in the debate over Intelligent Design. Several prominent writers have
argued that the problem of natural evil makes affirming biology as designed by
18 HUME, Dialogues and Natural History of Religion. Ed. John Gaskin. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008, p. 113.
19 See PLANTINGA, God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1977. For discussion
on the impact of the argument, see Graham OPPY, Arguing About Gods. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006, pp. 262–263. For further discussion of the problem see Michael MURRAY,
Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal Suffering. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011, as well as Christopher SOUTHGATE, The Groaning of Creation: God,
Evolution, and the Problem of Evil. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008. For an
interesting debate, see Paul DRAPER & Trent DOUGHERTY, “Explanation and the Problem of
Evil.” The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil. Ed. McBrayer, Justin P. & Howard-Snyder,
Daniel. Oxford: Blackwell, 2014. Pp. 71–87. Elsewhere, Dougherty argues that the distinction
between the logical and evidential problem collapses in light of how deductive arguments
actually work. Deductive arguments also do not assume that we have full certainty of their
premises before they can lend some credibility to the conclusion. Rather, to the degree that we
have confidence in the premises, we should also have confidence in the conclusion. DOUGHERTY,
The Problem of Animal Pain. London: PalgraveMcMillan, 2014, chapter 2.
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God theologically dangerous.20 The most extensive development of this objection
can be credited to biologist Francisco Ayala, to whom I now turn.
Explaining how biology, and indeed all of nature is suboptimally designed,
Ayala argues that “the natural world abounds in catastrophes, disasters, imper-
fections, dysfunctions, suffering, and cruelty”21 and shudders “in terror at the
thought that some people of faith would implicitly attribute the calamity to the
Creator’s faulty design.”22 For Ayala, “attributing these to specific agency by the
Creator amounts to blasphemy”.23 For Ayala, “Darwin’s gift” to religion is the
possibility to absolve God of the responsibility for any such natural evils, since
Darwin showed how the development of biological forms can happen without
God’s involvement, by a free process that God has started but does not control.
The basic idea of Ayala’s evolutionary theodicy being advanced is explained
succinctly by Michael Ruse:
But supposing that God did (and had to) create through law, then Richard Dawkins of all
people offers a piece of candy to the Christian. Dawkins argues that the only physical way to
get organic adaptation – the design-like nature of living beings – is through natural
selection, that very painful mechanism that worried Darwin! Other mechanisms are either
false (such as Lamarckism, the inheritance of acquired characteristics) or inadequate (such
as saltationism, change by sudden jumps). In other words, although Darwinism does not
speak to all cases of physical evil – the earthquakes – it does speak to the physical evil that
it itself is supposed to bring on. It is Darwinismwith suffering, or nothing.24
The argument is that if God wanted to create through an evolutionary process,
then he had to create through the Darwinian process, giving the process freedom
20 In addition to Ayala and Ruse, see e.  g. the BioLogos writers, scientists Karl Giberson and
Darrel Falk. GIBERSON, “Evolution and the Problem of Evil.” Beliefnet: Science and the Sacred.
Available at <http://blog.beliefnet.com/scienceandthesacred/2009/09/evolution-and-the-pro-
blem-of-evil.html>. Accessed on March 29, 2018. And FALK, “On Reducing Irreducible Complex-
ity, part II.” BioLogos website.Available at < https://biologos.org/blogs/archive/reducing-irreduci
ble-complexity-part-2>. Accessed onMarch 29, 2018.
21 AYALA,Darwin’s Gift to Science and Religion, x.
22 AYALA, Darwin’s Gift to Science and Religion, xi. One problem not discussed here is that the
suboptimality of biological design is sometimes hard to evaluate, and depends onwhat is thought
to be optimal and the end goal of biology. This has been much discussed by proponents of ID as a
possible response to the problem of bad design. However, to me this is in itself an insufficient
response. See Erkki Vesa Rope KOJONEN, The Intelligent Design Debate and the Temptation of
Scientism. London: Routledge, 2016, chapter 9.
23 AYALA,Darwin’s Gift to Science and Religion, p. 160.
24 Michael RUSE, “Darwinism and the Problem of Evil.” The Huffington Post. March 11, 2011.
Available at <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-ruse/darwinism-and-the-problem_b_835
094.html>. Accessed on January 24, 2014.
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to evolve in whatever direction. Creating in such a hands-off manner, God is no
longer to be blamed for the suffering that this evolutionary process creates.
Furthermore, the idea is that those who attempt to ascribe the responsibility for
biology to God cannot at the same time adopt this theodicy, and thereby respond
to the problem of natural evil. To apply this against Plantinga: if we are to give
glory to God for the beautiful biological designs of organisms, as his design
discourse implies, then surely we must also attribute God the blame for all the
bad design. But this would lead to compromising God’s goodness.
This challenge has many levels, andmany different responses could be given.
This argument says that the theist who wants to say the Creator is responsible for
biological forms will lose something good (the evolutionary theodicy), leaving
this theist with a serious problem (the problem of natural evil). Accordingly, it can
be responded to either by stating that the evolutionary theodicy is not actually
good, and that there are ways of responding to the problem also within Plantin-
ga’s design discourse. I will focus here on the first.
First, the viability of this particular evolutionary theodicy is theologically
dubious. Based on the traditional understanding of God, it is not clear that God
“had to” create through a lawlike process. As Robert J. Russell points out, this
seems to bypass God’s omnipotence, and ability to create any sort of laws of
nature he chooses: “Why then did God choose to create this universe with these
laws and constants knowing that they would as a consequence make the full
sweep of natural evil inevitable? In effect, the Ruse/Dawkins argument does not
rescue God from blame, but merely places blame at a foundational level, leading
to the Leibnizian challenge: is this the best of all possible universes?”25 The
necessity of a lawlike evolutionary process would fit better with process theism or
other views in which the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is abandoned.
Second, the viability of this theodicy also poses some scientific questions.
Ayala’s theodicy depends on his understanding of evolution as a highly contin-
gent process that does not have any direction built into it. Thus this theodicy will
only be credible if we buy into this account. But several biologists, notably have
made the case that evolution actually follows a predetermined direction at least
to some degree. In contrast to the view of Stephen Jay Gould and Ayala, they
present an almost Platonic understanding of evolution, in which evolution pro-
duces forms whose possibilities are already built into nature at the start.26 Argu-
25 Robert J. RUSSELL, “Recent Theological Interpretations of Evolution.” Theology and Science.
Vol. 11. No. 3. 169–184. 2013. P. 179.
26 See e. g. Simon CONWAY MORRIS, Life’s Solution: Inevitable Humans in a Lonely Universe.
Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2005, and “The Predictability of Evolution: Glimpses into a
Post-Darwinian World.” Naturwissenschaften. Vol. 96, 2009, pp. 1313–1337, and Andreas
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ments for fine-tuning also seem to show that the possibility of evolution is
dependent on a vast amount of fairly tight preconditions being fulfilled.27 The
extent of contingency in the evolutionary process depends on future findings of
science, but the general point of the dependence of evolution on such precondi-
tions does not. As Christian de Duve pointed out already in 1984, evolutionary
“chance did not operate in a vacuum. It operated in a universe governed by
orderly laws and made of matter endowed with specific properties. These laws
and properties are the constraints that shape the evolutionary roulette and restrict
the numbers that it can turn up.”28
Accordingly, what evolution can produce is constrained by these precondi-
tions, which are (in the theological understanding) created by God. If so, then God
controls what evolution can and cannot produce, and the evolutionary theodicy
seems unable to show that God is not responsible for biology.
There may be a more promising way to construct the evolutionary theodicy as
well, in a way that makes it compatible with creation ex nihilo. Namely: perhaps
God has some good reason for choosing to use an evolutionary process in
creation. Perhaps an evolutionary process has a beauty to it that demonstrates the
Creator’s ability better than the alternative of special creation, even though this
process produces suboptimal results and includes the possibility of suffering. As
Charles Kingsley famously wrote: “we knew of old that God was so wise that he
could make all things: but behold, He is so much wiser than that, that he can
make all things make themselves.”29 And as noted, there are also many other
responses to the problem of natural evil, few of which require giving up divine
WAGNER, Arrival of the Fittest: How Nature Innovates. New York, NY: Penguin, 2014. For the
contrary perspective, see Gould’s classic statement in Stephen Jay GOULD, Wonderful Life: The
Burgess Shale and the Nature of History. New York: W. W. Norton, 1989. For debate, see C. H.
LINEWEAVER, P. DAVIES, & M. RUSE (ed.), Complexity and the Arrow of Time. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2013.
27 See Geraint F. LEWIS & Luke BARNES, A Fortunate Universe: Life in a Finely Tuned Cosmos.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. For a defense of a fine-tuning design argument, see
Robin COLLINS, “The Teleological Argument.” In The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology.
Eds.William Lane Craig & J. P. Moreland.Malden, MA:Wiley-Blackwell, 2012. For debate, see Neil
A. MANSON (ed.), God and Design. The Teleological Argument and Modern Science. London:
Routledge, 2003.
28 Christian DE DUVE, A Guided Tour of the Living Cell. New York: Scientific American. 1984. I
owe the quote to Karl GIBERSON and Mariano ARTIGAS from their book Oracles of Science:
Celebrity Scientists versus God and Religion.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, 32–33.
29 Charles KINGSLEY, The Natural Theology of the Future, xxvii. London: Macmillan, 1874. Mats
Wahlberg comments on this: “If it takes more wisdom to create through an evolutionary process
than by hands-on-design, and if structures created by hand-on-design by humans are expressive
of human intent and intelligence, why could not structures created by God in that more wisdom-
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responsibility for biology, or assuming that God could not have created otherwise.
Demonstrating that Plantinga’s design discourse fails because of the theological
problem of natural evil would require showing that none of these theodicies are
viable; otherwise the Darwinian theodicy cannot be asserted as the only option.30
Nothing in this response absolves God of responsibility, however. Rather, it is
argued that God has a good reason for acting as he does, and to adopt an
evolutionary process leading to imperfect designs. As long as God’s responsibility
for biology is not abrogated, such an evolutionary theodicy seems compatible
with Plantinga’s design discourse.
III The Evolutionary Objection
To my mind, the more serious objection to Plantinga’s design discourse comes
from evolutionary biology. Here it is important to note, following Wahlberg, that
there are two different senses in which evolution could be a defeater for design
beliefs.31 First (1), it could be argued that there is a contradiction between evolu-
tion and design, such that both cannot be true at the same time. Against such
demanding way reflect divine intent and intelligence?”WAHLBERG, Reshaping Natural Theology,
182.
30 Christopher SOUTHGATE (The Groaning of Creation, pp. 387–388) also argues that evolution
as we know it “was indeed the only way, or the best way, God could give rise to creaturely selves.”
However, Southgate formulates his argument without assuming process theism, or without
denying creatio ex nihilo (see pp. 22–25).
I find three main ways of defending the value of the evolutionary process in the literature. First, it
has been argued that it is good for the universe to exhibit progress, as seen in evolution. Second, it
has been argued that any universe possessing autonomy must be evolutionary. Third, it has been
argued that it is good for God to keep his action in creating life hidden so as to support our
religious freedom. In my view, these reasons are not very convincing. For example, the idea of a
free evolutionary process as a requirement for the autonomy of creation seems strange. Why
should evolution as a process guarantee the freedom and autonomy of its products in a better way
than some alternative (e. g. special creation)? It seems that the autonomy of creatures depends on
what kind of properties they have (such as consciousness and the capacity for reciprocal love),
rather than what kind of process produced these properties. Furthermore, if we do not adopt
panpsychism, then creation is not conscious, and it does not seem fitting to talk of the value of
creation’s freedom in the same way as it does for conscious creatures. For some critique of
evolutionary theodicies along similar lines, see Murray, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw, chapter 6.
Murray also presents many other possible responses to the problem of natural evil. For further
discussion of the problem of natural evil in relation to biological design arguments, see also
Joseph CORABI, “Intelligent Design and Theodicy.” Religious Studies. Vol. 45. No. 1. 21–35, 2009,
and KOJONEN, The Intelligent Design Debate, chapter 9.
31 WAHLBERG, Reshaping Natural Theology, 173–174.
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critiques, Plantinga can appeal to all the common defenses of the compatibility of
evolution and creation.32 The second critique (2) is the more difficult one: evolu-
tion is argued to make design as an explanation unnecessary, and consequently
to undercut any basis for thinking that biology might provide positive reasons for
design belief. Evolution and design are conceived as competing explanations for
the same data, and once that data is explained by evolution, any basis for
perceiving or inferring design is lost.33
Dawkins argues that the success of evolution provides grounds to be suspi-
cious of all design arguments, not merely biological ones. According to Dawkins,
Darwinian evolution functions as a “consciousness-raiser” which shows that
teleology can be reduced to material processes, and that we should not trust our
intuitions about design in nature. He argues that “a deep understanding of
Darwinism teaches us to be wary of the easy assumption that design is the only
alternative to chance, and teaches us to seek out graded ramps of slowly increas-
ing complexity. [...] After Darwin, we should feel, deep in our bones, suspicious of
the very idea of design.”34 Dawkins argues that since Darwinism shows that
reductionistic explanations for teleology are possible, it provides grounds for the
reduction of all teleology to non-intentional material causes.35
There are also other ways to argue for evolution as a defeater, such as
evolutionary debunking arguments for the reliability of our design detection
faculties, but I will not consider these here. In my view, this is not currently a
good argument against the prima facie reliability of our design perceptions, since
all hold the design detection faculty to be generally reliable and essential for
human life. The possibility of false positives does not seem to be sufficiently likely
to render our perception of design in nature prima facie completely unreliable.
32 PLANTINGA, Where the Conflict Really Lies, chapters 1 and 2. Ian Barbour (1997) classifies
theistic evolutionism broadly into three forms. On the first view (1), God controls events that
appear to be random. In this view, the process of evolution is understood to be under God’s
control, though his supervision is not included in scientific theories of our origins. In the second
view (2), God designed a system of law and chance. God set up the universe at the beginning in a
way that makes evolution possible. In the third view (3), God influences the events of evolutionary
history without controlling them. In this view, God is understood to give the world much freedom
to evolve. God influences evolution through his love, but does not control it.
33 This critique is also at the core of the ID movement’s critique of theistic evolutionism. See
KOJONEN, The Intelligent Design Debate and the Temptation of Scientism, chapter 10.
34 Richard DAWKINS, The God Delusion, London: BantamBooks (2006), 139.
35 This is one point where ID proponent Phillip E. Johnson agrees with Dawkins. See Phillip E.
JOHNSON & John Mark REYNOLDS, Against all Gods: What’s Right (and Wrong) About the New
Atheists.Downer’s Grove, IL: IVP Books, 2010, chapter 4.
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Rather, it seems to me that its unreliability must be argued on a case by case
basis.36
Rather, I will focus on the main objection, which posits that evolution and
design are competing explanations, and that evolution as a well-supported scien-
tific explanation removes any rational basis for positing that biological forms are
designed. Plantinga has twomain responses here.37 First, he argues that evolution-
ary theory as it stands can at most give us an improbable possibility of explaining
the teleological features of life. As such it can, according to Plantinga, give us at
most a “partial undercutting defeater” for our beliefs formed through perceiving
life to be designed.38 Here Plantinga comes out clearly on the side of the ID move-
ment, andusesbiochemistMichael J. Behe’s argument from irreducible complexity
to defendhis view. Behehas famously argued that life is dependent onbiochemical
“irreducibly complex” systems, where each part is necessary for producing the
system’s main function. Behe argues that the evolution of such systems through
Darwinian evolution is extremely improbable, and that their properties are instead
better explained through intelligent design. Behe’s argument hasbeen criticizedby
many defenders of evolutionary biology, who argue that there are well-established
evolutionary mechanisms that can explain the evolution of such systems.39 In any
case, Plantinga’s response here is unacceptable for those who see evolution as the
probably true explanation for biology. If this were the only possible defense of
design discourse, then the project of this article (defending the possibility of design
discourse within a theistic evolutionist perspective) would be doomed to fail. I will
therefore turn to other possible responses to the evolutionary objection.
Plantinga’s second response is that the theist can appeal to his broader
theistic worldview to support the idea that evolution was guided by God, and that
the intuition of design in biology is thus correct.40 Even if there is no basis for
36 For discussion, see Helen DE CRUZ & Johan DE SMEDT, A Natural History of Natural Theology;
Wahlberg, Reshaping Natural Theology, chapter 6.4, Jeroen DE RIDDER, “Design Discourse and
the Cognitive Science of Design.” Philosophia Reformata, Vol. 79, No. 1. 37–53; Aku VISALA,
Naturalism, Theism and the Cognitive Study of Religion: Religion Explained? Ashgate Science and
Religion Series. Burlington, VT: Ashgate; and Jan-Olav HENRIKSEN, “A New Basis for Natural
Religion? Recent Explanations of Religion and Their Challenges to Contemporary Philosophy of
Religion.” Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie. Vol. 57. No. 4.
2015, pp. 464–482.
37 PLANTINGA,Where the Conflict Really Lies, pp. 251–264.
38 PLANTINGA,Where the Conflict Really Lies, p. 256.
39 Michael J. BEHE, Darwin’s Black Box. 10th Anniversary edition. New York, NY: The Free Press,
2006. For an extended discussion of Behe’s argument and responses to it, see KOJONEN, The
Intelligent Design Debate, pp. 60–71.
40 PLANTINGA,Where the Conflict Really Lies, p. 261.
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design discourse from the scientific point of view, the intuitive conclusion that
biology is designed might still be reaffirmed from the perspective of faith, because
from a theological point of view we might still have reasons to affirm that God has
guided evolution invisibly. Here Plantinga comes close to what Barbour has
called a “theology of nature”, in which reality is interpreted through a pre-
existent theological framework, in contrast to a natural theology, which is, in
William Alston’s words, “the enterprise of providing support for religious beliefs
by starting from premises that neither are nor presuppose any religious beliefs.”41
This is all well and good. However, if this is the only response, it seems to me
that it indeed entails giving up on some of the core features of Plantinga’s design
discourse, which he himself wishes to keep, because he also presents the argu-
ments of the Intelligent Design movement as a response. Namely: Plantinga aims
to show that the perception of biological design itself gives some internal support
for the believer’s faith in the existence of a Creator, even if it is in itself insufficient
for faith. If design discourse is understood as just a theology of nature, then it
does not yet make clear how it could provide such extra support for faith, or
provide any point of contact or signal of transcendence for those who believe that
evolutionary explanations are well-established.
It seems to me that to defend the rationality of this design discourse, it is
needed to go beyond the mere compatibility in principle of evolution and the
invisible guiding hand of God. Plantinga could also focus on a different premise
of the evolutionary objection, namely the idea that evolution and design are
competing explanations. Rather, he might argue that evolution, even if accepted,
still leaves something about biology to be explained, and that this something is
the very thing that triggers our design perceptions in the first place. In that case
the success of evolutionary explanations would not eliminate the grounds of the
design perception, and Plantinga’s design discourse would be safe from the
evolutionary objection. This would also show how design discourse could also be
useful within a theistic evolutionist perspective.
Clearly, theistic evolutionists cannot argue that organisms are designed in
the same way as human craftsmen make door hinges (recall the Darwin-quote at
the beginning of the article: “We can no longer argue that, for instance, the
beautiful hinge of a bivalve shell must have been made by an intelligent being,
like the hinge of a door by a man.”). Biological design arguments have indeed
historically been formulated in competition with natural explanations. Such
arguments typically proceed by identifying some property in biology that is then
41 WilliamALSTON, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1991, p. 289
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argued to be most credibly explained by design, such as teleology. And since
evolution is typically understood to explain the appearance of teleology in
biology by reference to non-teleological mechanisms, the supposition that design
and evolution are competing explanations seems at first plausible.42
However, here it seems to me that the work showing the dependence of the
evolutionary process in the “wider teleology” of the cosmos is relevant, as in the
case of the objection from bad design.43 When analysing that objection, I con-
cluded that we cannot absolve God of responsibility for biological bad design
wholly, because those features of organisms come about through a process that
depends on background conditions, which depend on divine action. However, if
this is correct, it also seems to imply that evolution does not absolve God of the
responsibility for teleology. This is because on this understanding, the mechan-
isms of evolution studied by evolutionary biology do not provide a complete
explanation of teleology. Rather, the power of these evolutionary mechanisms
depends on the wider teleology of the cosmos. And the problem of the origin of
biological teleology is also pushed back to the laws of nature, rather than being
“explained away” completely by evolution.44 The extent to which the problem is
pushed back to the laws of nature depends on our precise understanding of
evolution, how Platonic our understanding of evolution is, and how contingent
evolution is understood to be. This means that here philosophy of religion can
benefit from dialogue with the latest evolutionary biology. For Conway Morris
evolution is somewhat contingent, but has a clear direction; according to Gould
the course of evolution is wholly unpredictable.45 Here new developments in
42 See KOJONEN, The Intelligent Design Debate, chapter 8 for an extensive overview of the logic
of design arguments.
43 On the concept of a “wider teleology”, see Alister MCGRATH, Darwinism and the Divine:
Evolutionary Thought and Natural Theology. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Accounts like these
are much indebted to Augustine’s “rationales semioles”. On Augustine’s theology of creation in
relation to evolution, see Matthew LEVERING, “Augustine on Creation: An Exercise in the
Dialectical Retrieval of the Ancients.” InWisdom and the Renewal of Catholic Theology: Essays in
Honor of Matthew L. Lamb. Ed. Thomas P. Harmon and Roger W. Nutt, 49–65. Eugene, OR:
Pickwick, 2016. See also Ernan MCMULLIN, “On the Origin of Terrestrial Life: A Christian
Perspective.” In Exploring the Origin, Extent, and Future of Life: Philosophical, Ethical, and
Theological Perspectives. Ed. Constance M. Bertka, 80–95. Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2009.
44 The concept of “explaining away” in relation to evolutionary explanations has been analysed
more extensively by David GLASS, “Can Evidence for Design be Explained Away?” In V. Harrison
and J. Chandler (eds.), Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012, pp. 77–102.
45 A highly interesting analogy on this point is provided by WAHLBERG (Reshaping Natural
Theology, 70–71.) Defending the notion that biology might provide perceptual evidence of design
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evolutionary biology are also relevant. As Nicole Hoggard Creegan argues, “While
teleology strained against the grammar of natural selection alone, it is not at all a
foreign or difficult concept in the light of convergence, evo devo, and epige-
netics.”46 If understood in such a way, it seems to me that evolution does not
necessarily need to threaten the rationality of Plantinga’s design discourse.47 In
that case evolution does not yet show that our agency detection device is incorrect
or removes the grounds of our perception of design. Rather, we could simply be
perceiving the rational potentiality of the cosmos through biological organisms,
which are the supreme manifestations of that potential. The Creator’s wisdom
could thus be indirectly manifest in biology, even if the Creator has left the
specifics to chance and natural processes.
IV Conclusion
In this article, I have analysed Alvin Plantinga’s design discourse as a promising
new attempt to make sense of the idea of purposeful design as part of a religious
understanding of biological order. I have analysed two main objections against
Plantinga: a theological objection based on the problem of natural evil, and a
scientific objection based on evolutionary explanations. I have argued that while
even in an evolutionary cosmos, Wahlberg also makes use of the analogy with evolutionary
computer algorithms. There exists a computer program that can write four-part fugues. The user
of the program just needs to give the program a general theme, and it will then produce a fugue
with many properties that cannot be predicted by the programmer or the user. Nevertheless, all of
the fugues will have several features in common: they will be structured according to the western
tonal system, exemplify a certain artistic style and so forth. So, it seems fair to say that in terms of
these essential features, the products of the program will still be expressive of the programmer’s
intent, even if the particulars are left to chance. Similarly, creatures might be expressive of the
Creator’s intent, even if the particulars are left to chance.
Wahlberg (Reshaping Natural Theology, chapter 7) further notes that speaking of God as the
“designer” of biology need not imply that God is responsible for each property of biological
organisms, just as a human designer of a house need not be responsible for every particular detail
of how the construction work turns out. He goes on to note, however, that for some speaking of
God as broadly as “creator” of biology rather than the “designer” of biology may better describe
the nature of God’s involvement.
46 Nicola Hoggard CREEGAN, Animal Suffering and the Problem of Evil.Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2013, 121. Creegan is careful to defend this only as a theological and philosophical
possibility opened by the new developments, rather than providing grounds for a natural theolo-
gical design argument.
47 See further also KOJONEN, “Salvaging the Biological Design Argument in Light of Darwin-
ism?” Theology & Science.Vol. 14. No. 3. 2016.
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Plantinga himself defends his approach through recourse to the Intelligent De-
sign movement’s arguments, it can also be utilized within a theistic evolutionistic
view, which accepts mainstream evolutionary biology. However, the viability of
design discourse within a theistic evolutionist view is more plausible if the wider
teleology of the cosmos is very important for the evolution of biological organ-
isms, and evolution can be understood in an almost Platonic way as the creation
of forms whose potential is already embedded within their nature at the start. In
that case evolution and design do not need to be understood as competing
explanations, but as complementary ones. God is not absolved of responsibility
for biological “bad design”, but neither does he lose glory for the biology’s “end-
less forms most beautiful”.48
48 The phrase is from the closing remarks of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species: “There is
grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the
Creator into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to
the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most
wonderful have been, and are being, evolved.” (DARWIN, On the Origin of Species. Ed. Gillian
Beer. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 360.) The remark “breathed by a Creator” was
added by Darwin in the second edition to emphasize the compatibility of evolution and creation.
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